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Note
Judicial Review of SEC Rules: Managing the
Costs of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Rachel A. Benedict∗
On July 22, 2011, the staff at the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) heard the discouraging news that approxi1
mately 21,000 hours of its work over the past two years were
lost when a federal circuit court overturned the new proxy ac2
cess rule. The SEC reviewed and incorporated 600 public
comments in constructing the rule, with an estimated cost of
3
$2.2 million to the agency. The time and money spent over the
last two years were not the SEC’s only investment in this
rule—the SEC had evaluated similar regulations on multiple
4
occasions dating back to 1942. The time seemed ripe for enacting the new rule in light of recent corporate scandals and the
Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation explicitly authorizing
5
the SEC to promulgate a proxy access rule. Yet the D.C. Circuit effectively sent the SEC back to the drawing board when it
found that the rule was “arbitrary and capricious” despite the
6
SEC’s seventy-three pages of cost-benefit analysis.
∗ J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School. I would
like to thank the editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their helpful advice and edits, and my husband, David, for his continuous support
throughout my legal education. Copyright © 2012 by Rachel A. Benedict.
1. See Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to
Scott Garrett, Representative, U.S. House of Representatives 2 (Aug. 5, 2011),
available at http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/sec-and
-governance/SEC-letter%208-5-11.pdf.
2. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
3. Letter from Mary L. Schapiro to Scott Garrett, supra note 1, at 2.
4. See Exchange Act Release No. 34 -3347, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,653 (Dec. 18,
1942); Exchange Act Release No. 13,901, 12 SEC Docket 1630 (Aug. 29, 1977);
Exchange Act Release No. 34 -31,326, 52 SEC Docket 2028 (Oct. 16, 1992); Exchange Act Release No. 34 -47,778, 80 SEC Docket 248 (May 1, 2003).
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
6. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148; J. Robert Brown, Jr., Shareholder
Access and Uneconomic Analysis: Business Roundtable v. SEC 2 (Univ. of
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Courts have long been held to a deferential standard in
7
setting aside arbitrary and capricious agency actions. However, judicial application of this standard to the SEC’s costbenefit analyses has become increasingly stringent, with the
D.C. Circuit alone vacating three SEC rules in the past seven
8
years for failure to adequately consider the costs of the rule.
This pattern only aggravates the SEC’s struggle to stretch its
9
limited resources across a rapidly growing workload. The
strain on SEC resources is especially problematic since the
Dodd-Frank legislation tasked the SEC with promulgating
10
more than ninety mandatory rules. More stringent judicial
scrutiny of SEC cost-benefit analyses delays enactment of
11
rules, and the recent string of D.C. Circuit decisions invalidating SEC rules could jeopardize dozens of other SEC rules man12
dated under the Dodd-Frank legislation. Additionally, the cost
of conducting a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis may outweigh the corresponding efficiency gains for some rules, since a
single cost-benefit analysis can cost as much as six million dol13
lars.
This Note argues that the scope of judicial review of SEC
cost-benefit analysis must be clearly defined in order to prevent
rendering cost-benefit analysis itself an inefficient and overly
burdensome exercise. Part I discusses the traditional standard
of agency review, the role of cost-benefit analysis in SEC ruleDenver Strum Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-14, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1917451.
7. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
8. See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148; Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co.
v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 177–79 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC,
412 F.3d 133, 143–44 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
9. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-302, SEC OPERATIONS: INCREASED WORKLOAD CREATES CHALLENGES 13 (2002) (highlighting the disproportionately small increase in the number of SEC staff compared with the
growth of its workload over the last decade).
10. See Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
dodd-frank.shtml (last modified Sept. 7, 2012).
11. See Ira Teinowitz, Investor Council Urges SEC to Keep Fighting on
Proxy Access, THE DEAL PIPELINE (Aug. 24, 2011, 6:04 AM), http://www
.thedeal.com/content/regulatory/investor-council-urges-sec-to-keep-fighting-on
-proxy-access.php.
12. See id.
13. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: COSTS AT
SELECTED AGENCIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS viii
(1997), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/40xx/
doc4015/1997doc04 -entire.pdf.
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making, and the increasingly strict standard imposed on SEC
rules. Part II examines the problems with subjecting SEC costbenefit analysis to an unduly strict standard of judicial review.
Part III introduces several alternative solutions to the current
standard of review that would reduce the administrative burden of comprehensive economic analysis while preserving the
overall benefits of a thoughtful cost-benefit analysis. This Note
concludes that the most effective solution is for Congress to
make a clear statement limiting the required scope of the SEC’s
cost-benefit analysis. Such a statement is necessary to ensure
that the efficiency gains from cost-benefit analysis outweigh
the expense of conducting the analysis in the first place.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SEC RULES
Congress has increasingly delegated its rulemaking authority to administrative agencies, tasking them with the responsibility of establishing regulations that implement the
14
broad directives it has issued. Political pressures often hamper Congress’s ability to act efficiently and can prevent rea15
soned debate. Agencies are well-equipped to assume this
rulemaking role because their independence insulates them
16
from the volatility of the political climate. At the same time,
the United States’ democratic system and constitutional separation of powers require agencies to be accountable to each of
the branches of government, thus tempering agency independ17
ence. This Part discusses the extent of judicial constraints on
SEC rulemaking in three sections. First, it examines the
standard of judicial review provided in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the SEC’s enabling statutes, and case law.
Next, it addresses the role of cost-benefit analysis in agency
rulemaking. Finally, this Part describes recent appellate court
decisions invalidating SEC rules for failure to conduct adequate
cost-benefit analyses.

14. See 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 4:10 (3d ed. 2010).
15. Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and Corporate Law: The Case for Regulatory Redundancy, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1273, 1306–08 (2009).
16. Id. at 1310.
17. Id. at 1319; see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502,
536 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If agencies were permitted unbridled
discretion, their actions might violate important constitutional principles of
separation of powers and checks and balances.”).
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A. STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
The APA was enacted in 1946 in response to New Deal leg18
islation. It establishes federal agency rulemaking procedures
and grants federal courts the power to set aside agency rules
that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other19
wise not in accordance with law.” Agency rules are typically
20
evaluated under the arbitrariness standard of review, though
courts have offered different formulations of the standard over
21
time. In National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, a 2007 decision, the Supreme Court articulated a narrow
scope of review for arbitrariness:
[W]e will not vacate an agency’s decision unless it “has relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider, entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or
is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view
22
or the product of agency expertise.”

The circuit courts have followed this formulation of the arbitrariness standard, finding it satisfied when there is a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice
23
made.” A reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its
own policy judgment for that of the agency when it applies the
24
arbitrariness test. In sum, an agency rule will fail under the
deferential arbitrariness standard only if it is entirely without
25
a rational basis.
18. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558–59
(1996) (“The APA expressed the nation’s decision to permit extensive government, but to avoid dictatorship and central planning.”).
19. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
20. See 3 KOCH, supra note 14, § 9:25[4](a).
21. See id. § 9:25[1] (noting that “there is no clear meaning for arbitrariness review”).
22. 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
23. Greenbaum v. EPA, 370 F.3d 527, 542 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)); see also
Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Anderson v. U.S.
Dep’t of Transp., 213 F.3d 422, 423 (8th Cir. 2000).
24. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513–14 (2009) (“We
have made clear, however, that ‘a court is not to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency,’ and should ‘uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if
the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’” (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43; Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc.,
419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974))).
25. See 3 KOCH, supra note 14, § 9:25[2] (recognizing that the arbitrari-
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B. THE ROLE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN AGENCY
RULEMAKING
The APA’s general standard for federal agencies is accompanied by the requirements set forth in the SEC’s enabling
26
statutes. The Securities Exchange Act requires the SEC to
take into consideration a rule’s impact on efficiency, competi27
tion, capital formation, and protection of investors. Courts
have interpreted this statutory mandate to require the SEC to
28
conduct an economic analysis for proposed rules.
Cost-benefit analysis has played an increasingly significant
29
role in rulemaking decisions since the 1970s. Cost-benefit
analysis seeks to objectively quantify the projected consequences, both monetary and intangible, of a proposed rule in
order to determine whether it will result in a net gain to the
30
public. Though the overall value of cost-benefit analysis was
hotly contested for years, a general consensus in favor of conducting some level of economic analysis appears to have
31
emerged. Now, the debate surrounding cost-benefit analysis
centers on the proper extent of such analysis and the judiciary’s
32
role in evaluating its adequacy.
ness test “rejects only those decisions which are outside any conceivable rational alternative”).
26. Jones, supra note 15, at 1313.
27. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f ) (2006) (“Whenever
. . . the Commission is engaged in rulemaking . . . the Commission shall also
consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”). The Investment
Company Act of 1940 sets forth the same requirement. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a2(c) (2006). While the efficiency, competition, and capital formation considerations collectively compose the requirement to conduct an economic analysis,
the protection of investors was the SEC’s founding mission. The Investor ’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/
about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified Oct. 12, 2012).
28. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (“The Commission . . . has a ‘statutory obligation to determine as best it
can the economic implications of the rule.’” (quoting Chamber of Commerce v.
SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005))); Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v.
SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 177–79 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that the SEC failed to
consider the rule’s effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation
when it did not engage in a well-reasoned economic analysis).
29. 1 KOCH, supra note 14, § 4:51.
30. Id. §§ 4:51, 4:52[1].
31. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION xi (2002).
32. Id.; see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in
Its Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 335, 335 (2011)
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The Supreme Court has not provided much guidance in defining when and to what extent cost-benefit analysis must be
33
used in agency decision making. The only direction that can
be inferred from Supreme Court decisions is that cost-benefit
analysis is required when the statutory language or legislative
history reflects Congress’s intent that the agency engage in
34
economic analysis. Though the Supreme Court has implicitly
recognized the utility of cost-benefit analysis, it will not judicially require an agency to undertake an economic analysis in
rulemaking unless the statute can be interpreted to incorporate
35
such a requirement.
C. RECENT APPELLATE REVIEW OF SEC COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS
As a result of the Supreme Court’s silence on the proper
bounds of judicial review of agency cost-benefit analysis, lower
36
courts have been given a substantial degree of freedom. In a
series of recent opinions, the D.C. Circuit has used this freedom
to invalidate SEC rules for failure to adequately consider their
37
economic consequences. The three subsections below discuss
the findings and rationales of those opinions.
1. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC
In 2005, the D.C. Circuit handed down the first of its three
recent decisions criticizing the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis of a

(recognizing the value of cost-benefit analysis but arguing that its use should
be limited to regulatory areas that comport well with its underlying assumptions).
33. 1 KOCH, supra note 14, § 4:51[3].
34. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
644 –46 (1980) (finding that the statute and its legislative history contemplated that the agency undertake some measure of a cost-benefit analysis before
promulgating a new regulatory standard); 1 KOCH, supra note 14, § 4:51[3]
(“[The Supreme Court’s] current position might be summarized as requiring
that any cost/benefit analysis must be under expressed direction of Congress
or of executive leadership.”).
35. See 1 KOCH, supra note 14, § 4:51[3].
36. See Brett Friedman et al., Recent Decisions of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Administrative Law, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 619, 656–57 (2006) (noting that the lack of a clear standard for
reviewing SEC economic analyses “puts a large amount of power in the hands
of future courts”).
37. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 177–79 (D.C. Cir. 2010);
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143–44 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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38

new rule. The court found that the SEC violated the APA
when it passed a rule amendment increasing board independence requirements for mutual funds without fully considering
39
its costs.
The SEC passed this amendment in response to recent
abuses in the mutual fund industry, believing that the amendment’s strengthened board independence requirements would
address the root problem behind these abuses—the failure of
investment company boards to prevent their advisers’ conflicts
40
of interest. The SEC based the rule on its experience, comment letters, and other evidence, but it did not conduct an extensive empirical study because the available data was conflict41
ing and unpersuasive. The court found that the SEC’s failure
to base the rule amendment on an empirical study did not con42
stitute arbitrary action under the APA.
However, the SEC had difficulty providing an aggregate
cost prediction for the rule because of the many ways a fund
43
could satisfy its conditions. The court determined that the
SEC’s failure to estimate costs to the best of its ability violated
its obligation under the Investment Company Act and the
44
APA. The uncertainty involved in the cost calculation did “not
excuse the Commission from its statutory obligation to do what
it can to apprise itself—and hence the public and the Con38. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 136.
39. Id. The amendment conditioned certain exemptions on the mutual
fund having a board with at least seventy-five percent independent directors
and an independent chairman. Id. at 137. Previously, only fifty percent of a
fund’s directors were required to be independent. Id. at 141.
40. Id. at 140–41; see also Jones, supra note 15, at 1327 (“The mutual
fund scandals . . . were serious enough to command regulators’ attention, yet
they lacked the political salience necessary to spur Congress to action. This
regulatory space . . . represents a middle ground in which the SEC’s role as
first responder is critical.”).
41. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,383–84
(Aug. 2, 2004).
42. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 142 (“[W]e are acutely aware that
an agency need not—indeed cannot—base its every action upon empirical data; depending upon the nature of the problem, an agency may be ‘entitled to
conduct . . . a general analysis based on informed conjecture.’” (quoting
Melcher v. FCC, 134 F.3d 1143, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1998))).
43. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,387.
44. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144 (holding that the SEC violated
its duty to consider whether the rule would promote efficiency, competition,
and capital formation under the Investment Company Act, rendering the rule
arbitrary under the APA); see Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (2006); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c)
(2006).
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gress—of the economic consequences of a proposed regula45
tion.”
The Chamber of Commerce decision failed to clearly state
judicial expectations for a proper agency cost-benefit analysis.
Though the court did not require the SEC to conduct an empirical analysis based on data it considered unpersuasive, the SEC
was required to estimate costs, even when it believed there was
46
no reliable basis for such a calculation. This resulted in significant uncertainty as to when courts will require empirical data
47
to support proposed rules.
2. American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC
The second decision in the D.C. Circuit’s trilogy of opinions
vacating SEC rules based on faulty cost-benefit analysis was
48
handed down in 2010. The rule at issue in this case rendered
fixed index annuities (FIAs) subject to disclosure requirements
49
and other protections. The SEC proposed this rule because
FIAs involve significant investment risk based on the underlying securities market but lack the protections associated with
50
securities instruments.
The court held that the rule was arbitrary and capricious
under the APA because the SEC’s analysis of its effects on efficiency, capital formation, and competition under the Exchange
51
Act was flawed. The SEC found that the rule’s benefits (creating regulatory certainty, assisting investors in making informed decisions through enhanced disclosure, and increasing
investor confidence) outweighed the associated costs (registration and disclosure costs and loss of revenue to insurance com52
panies that stop issuing FIAs). Though the SEC conducted a
cost-benefit analysis, the court determined that its fatal defect

45. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144.
46. See Friedman et al., supra note 36, at 647.
47. Id. at 656–57 (arguing that the court’s vague holding “puts a large
amount of power in the hands of future courts” and will likely cause agencies
to conduct an empirical analysis for all rules in order to protect themselves
from the uncertainty associated with judicial review).
48. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 179 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
49. Id. at 171.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 177.
52. Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed.
Reg. 3138, 3161–72 (Jan. 16, 2009).
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was a failure to determine the existing level of efficiency, com53
petition, and capital formation under the current legal regime.
3. Business Roundtable v. SEC
In 2011, the D.C. Circuit struck down the SEC’s new proxy
access rule in its most recent decision regarding cost-benefit
54
analysis. The rule at issue required companies to include
shareholder nominees for director elections in their proxy materials in order to mitigate the prohibitive expense to shareholders of distributing the proxy materials on behalf of share55
holder-nominated candidates. The SEC had proposed a
similar proxy access rule on many occasions dating back to the
56
1940s out of concern that shareholders exercising their legal
right to submit director nominations were unlikely to be suc57
cessful under the current system. The SEC finally adopted the
rule in 2010, pursuant to Congress’s specific grant of authority
58
in the Dodd-Frank legislation.
Though the SEC dedicated more than 21,000 staff hours to
59
the rule and produced a substantial body of economic analy60
sis, the court found that it failed to adequately consider the
rule’s effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation,
61
and therefore acted arbitrarily. The court sharply criticized
the SEC for making speculative predictions, relying on two empirical studies that the court found unpersuasive, and failing to
address the possibility that special interest shareholders will
62
submit nominees in order to gain leverage. This decision has
53. Am. Equity, 613 F.3d at 177–79.
54. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
55. Brown, supra note 6, at 1. The proxy access rule only permitted
shareholders owning three percent or more of the company’s stock for at least
three years to include a limited number of nominees (not to exceed twenty-five
percent of the board) in the company’s proxy materials. Id.
56. See Exchange Act Release No. 34 -3347, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,653 (Dec. 18,
1942); Exchange Act Release No. 34 -13,901, 12 SEC Docket 1656 (Aug. 29,
1977); Exchange Act Release No. 34 -31,326, 52 SEC Docket 2028 (Oct. 16,
1992); Exchange Act Release No. 34 -47,778, 80 SEC Docket 248 (May 1, 2003);
Exchange Act Release No. 34 -56,160, 91 SEC Docket 544 (July 27, 2007).
57. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1147.
58. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
59. See Letter from Mary L. Schapiro to Scott Garrett, supra note 1, at 2.
60. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668,
56,753–76 (Sept. 16, 2010) (producing twenty-three pages of cost-benefit analysis for the proxy access rule).
61. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148–49.
62. Id. at 1150–52.
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garnered significant criticism from commentators who are concerned about the long-term consequences of imposing a “nigh
impossible” standard for cost-benefit analyses in SEC rulemak63
ing.
In sum, the D.C. Circuit’s recent trilogy of decisions illustrates a trend toward heightened judicial scrutiny of SEC costbenefit analyses. However, the court’s reasoning in these three
cases is inconsistent and fails to clearly establish judicial expectations for cost-benefit analyses. The lack of statutory basis
for this level of judicial scrutiny and its potential to interfere
with other important rulemaking objectives is problematic.
Given the preceding discussion, Part II analyzes the issues associated with strict judicial review of SEC cost-benefit analysis
and evaluates the alternative solutions.
II. MANAGING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN A COSTEFFECTIVE MANNER
Increasingly stringent judicial review of SEC cost-benefit
analysis has a direct and substantial impact on the agency’s
ability to carry out its responsibilities and its statutory man64
date. The first section of this Part will examine the problems
that result from stringent judicial treatment of the SEC’s costbenefit analyses—delays in enacting important rules, magnified costs of rulemaking, reluctance to update previously enacted rules, and deviation from the SEC’s statutory obligations.
The second section will discuss possible alternatives to address
these problems and critique them based on the statutory and
precedential context for judicial review of cost-benefit analysis
as discussed in Part I.

63. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 6, at 4 –5 (arguing that the court’s decision
“imposed an extraordinarily difficult burden on the Commission” that
“make[s] rulemaking more difficult and encourage[s] legal challenges”); Stanley Keller, What Now for Proxy Access?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 18, 2011, 9:29 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2011/08/18/what-now-for-proxy-access/ (stating his concern about the
“high, nigh impossible, bar the Court set that could put in jeopardy most SEC
rulemaking of any complexity or controversy”).
64. See Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1019 (2000) (“The shadow of
judicial review has a pervasive effect on agency decisionmaking, and the commands of preceding cases can have an enormous unforeseen effect on policymaking, even in areas that are not related directly to the policies previously
litigated.”).
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A. PROBLEMS WITH STRICT JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SEC COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS
The D.C. Circuit’s recent trilogy of opinions invalidating
SEC rules for failure to conduct an adequate cost-benefit analysis all reached the same outcome, but they did not enunciate a
65
consistent standard for the holdings. As a result, the SEC is
left with significant uncertainty as to the extent of cost-benefit
analysis required for a rule to survive judicial challenge in the
66
future. Consequently, new SEC rules are delayed and the
costs associated with rulemaking continue to grow. Furthermore, the SEC is hesitant to alter existing rules because such
modification is subject to the same judicial scrutiny as a new
rule. The judiciary’s increasingly stringent review of costbenefit analysis also distracts the SEC from its fundamental
mission of investor protection and undermines its independence.
1. Rulemaking Delays
Strict judicial review of cost-benefit analysis renders the
SEC rulemaking process unnecessarily time-consuming, there67
by slowing the enactment of valuable legislation. Such delays
occur for several reasons. First, uncertainty as to the level of
judicial scrutiny encourages the SEC to engage in defensive
rulemaking by conducting a comprehensive cost-benefit analy68
sis for every rule it promulgates. In order to protect rules from
judicial invalidation, cost-benefit analysis becomes a “prophylactic measure” that is exercised regardless of the value that it
69
adds to a particular rule. Attempting to anticipate every pos65. See supra Part I.C.
66. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING
PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 165 (1997) (noting that most commentators agree judicial review of agency rules causes uncertainty because of
the courts’ lack of sophistication in agency matters).
67. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1412 (1992). “Important rulemaking initiatives grind along at such a deliberate pace that they are often consigned to
regulatory purgatory, never to be resurrected again.” Id. at 1388.
68. See Friedman et al., supra note 36, at 657–58 (“The threat of judicial
review and the uncertainty over what a reviewing court will find to be ‘arbitrary and capricious’ are two of the principal reasons that administrative
rulemaking has become ossified, creating significant delays for agencies seeking to develop regulations.”).
69. See id. at 657 (arguing that the SEC will engage in cost-benefit analysis for every rule as a result of the vague standard set forth in Chamber of
Commerce v. SEC); see also MASHAW, supra note 66, at 165 (“[T]he real imped-
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sible challenge to a proposed rule and developing economic data
in response involves a substantial, and potentially endless, ex70
ertion of time and resources.
Second, stringent judicial review of cost-benefit analysis
causes rulemaking delay by decreasing the quantity of rules
71
that the SEC is able to promulgate. Conducting an intensive
cost-benefit analysis for each rule not only lengthens the timeline for an individual rule but also necessarily detracts from the
SEC’s ability to promulgate other, equally urgent rules in a
72
timely manner. As a result, the SEC’s ability to enact a comprehensive regulatory agenda is severely constrained—the invalidation of a single rule can create a ripple effect that upsets
73
a vast number of interrelated rules. For example, the D.C.
Circuit’s review of the proxy access rule in Business Roundtable
also required the SEC to place a stay on an amendment to a related rule, because the amendment “was designed to comple74
ment [the proxy access rule] and is intertwined.” The court’s
invalidation of the proxy access rule may have changed the
regulatory situation so much that the SEC must conduct a newcost benefit analysis and open a new comment period to validly
iment created by judicial review is uncertainty. Because the courts are relatively uninformed about what is important among the many issues thrown up
by parties seeking review of a rule, and because they are technically and scientifically unsophisticated in analyzing the issues that they perceive to be critical to a rule’s ‘reasonableness,’ the perception in the agencies is that anything
can happen. This produces defensive rulemaking, if not abandonment of the
rulemaking process.”).
70. See Cross, supra note 64, at 1023 (noting that the time an agency
spends “playing defense” takes away from its ability to take affirmative regulatory action); McGarity, supra note 67, at 1412 (“Because they can never
know what issues dissatisfied litigants will raise on appeal, they must attempt
to prepare responses to all contentions that may prove credible to an appellate
court, no matter how ridiculous they may appear to agency staff.”); David S.
Hilzenrath, Appeals Decision Is a Victory for Opponents of SEC’s New Wall
Street Regulations, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/business/economy/appeals-decision-is-a-victory-for-opponents-of-secs-new
-wall-street-regulations/2011/08/05/gIQAGSAg8I_story.html (quoting former
SEC commissioner Harvey J. Goldschmid’s comment that “[i]f the court’s unrealistic requirements were applied across the board, the regulatory process
would grind to a halt”).
71. Cross, supra note 64, at 1021.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 1027–36 (arguing that ad hoc judicial invalidation of rules
creates “agenda disruption” and fails to recognize the broad interrelatedness of
agency rules).
74. Order Granting Stay, Securities Act Release No. 9149, Exchange Act
Release No. 63,031, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,456, File No. S710-09 (Oct. 4, 2010).
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75

lift the stay on the amendment. This type of constraint is especially problematic in light of the SEC’s substantial rulemak76
ing responsibilities under the Dodd-Frank legislation. While
Congress continuously increases the SEC’s workload, the courts
decrease the SEC’s ability to perform these duties in a timely
77
manner. Rulemaking delay undermines one of the primary
benefits of delegating rulemaking authority to agencies: their
ability to act quickly and decisively in response to changing cir78
cumstances.
Third, judicial scrutiny of cost-benefit analysis causes
enormous rulemaking delay with respect to the particular rule
79
that a court remands or invalidates. Justice Stephen Breyer
recognized that “[a] remand of an important agency rule (several years in the making) for more thorough consideration may
well mean several years of additional proceedings, with mounting costs, and the threat of further judicial review leading to
abandonment or modification of the initial project irrespective
80
of the merits.” After losing all the time and resources associated with an invalidated or remanded rule, the SEC is reluctant to risk the loss of more time and resources, essentially
81
gambling with taxpayer money, by trying again. As a result,
judicial invalidation or remand of a rule is likely to kill it altogether, as SEC resources are already dedicated to other pro75. See Keller, supra note 63. However, failure to lift the stay would create significant confusion for companies and shareholders. See Yin Wilczek,
Corporate Governance: Court Vacates SEC’s Proxy Access Rule, Cites Failure to
Assess Economic Impact, BANKING DAILY, July 25, 2011, available at 2011 WL
2938907.
76. Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, supra note 10 (stating that the Dodd-Frank Act contains more
than ninety provisions that mandate SEC rulemaking and dozens more conferring discretionary rulemaking authority).
77. R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44
ADMIN. L. REV. 245, 246 (1992) (“Judicial review has subjected agencies to debilitating delay and uncertainty. Courts have heaped new tasks on agencies
while decreasing their ability to perform any of them.”).
78. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941) (“It is not the province of a
court to absorb the administrative functions to such an extent that the executive or legislative agencies become mere fact-finding bodies deprived of the advantages of prompt and definite action.”).
79. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy,
38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 383 (1986).
80. Id.
81. Cross, supra note 64, at 1024 (“[I]n addition to slowing the process of
rulemaking, judicial review can have the effect of discouraging rulemaking altogether.”).
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jects that rank higher on the list of priorities than the failed
82
rule.
2. Heightened Costs of Rulemaking
In addition to rulemaking delays, strict judicial review of
cost-benefit analysis causes the SEC to conduct expensive economic analyses that may not result in rules with corresponding
83
cost savings or efficiency gains. Though a thorough costbenefit analysis may be worthwhile for some rules, requiring
such an analysis for every rule the SEC promulgates inevitably
84
results in some unnecessary agency expenditures. When the
purpose of a cost-benefit analysis is to ensure that the cost of a
particular regulation is justified, it is absurd for an agency to
expend more of its scarce resources conducting an analysis
85
than could be gained back in efficiency benefits. In many
cases, the additional cost-benefit analysis conducted to protect
a particular rule from invalidation does not improve the substance of the rule—it only bolsters the SEC’s defense of its posi86
tion.
82. See McGarity, supra note 67, at 1401 (“[A] trip back to the drawing
board can send the project spinning off in odd directions or, worse, can consign
it to oblivion as the agency's limited staff resources are committed to other
projects, institutional memory fades, and more immediate priorities press old
rulemaking initiatives to the bottom of the agenda.”). But see H.R. REP. NO.
104 -622, at 24 (1996) (“The bill also would require the SEC to consider the
burden of regulations or rules on capital formation, efficiency, and competition. Because the SEC currently conducts cost-benefit analysis in conjunction
with its rulemakings, [we] would not expect this provision to result in any additional costs to the federal government.”). Congress failed to consider the impact of stringent judicial review of SEC cost-benefit analysis on rulemaking
costs and clearly did not intend such analysis to be the resource-draining procedure that it is today. See id.
83. See Cross, supra note 64, at 1022 (commenting that excessive judicial
scrutiny causes “certain rules—that otherwise could be justified in themselves—[to] become cost ineffective in light of the additional procedural demands”).
84. Comprehensive cost-benefit analysis for minor rules will generally be
an inefficient use of agency resources, since a single cost-benefit analysis can
cost more than six million dollars. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS: COSTS AT SELECTED AGENCIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS viii (1997), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/40xx/doc4015/1997doc04 -entire.pdf.
85. See McGarity, supra note 67, at 1391 (“When agencies expend twice as
many resources to achieve the same results, the taxpayer is the ultimate loser.”).
86. See Cross, supra note 64, at 1046 (“Judicial review does not improve
the substance of regulations, just their explanation to an uninformed judicial
audience. Resources devoted to such procedures and explanations (and re-
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Furthermore, the costs associated with defending a partic87
ular rule that comes under judicial challenge are significant.
The resources that the SEC dedicates to respond to judicial
proceedings are allocated away from other important rulemak88
ing and enforcement initiatives. The costs related to defending
a challenged rule are so large that special interest groups can
use the threat of a judicial proceeding to pressure the SEC to
compromise on the proposed regulation, or prevent the issuance
89
of the rule altogether. Judicial review of SEC rules essentially
creates another chance for parties who unsuccessfully opposed
a regulation at the legislative level to prevent its implementation by challenging the rule through judicial channels, at great
90
expense to the agency and ultimately to taxpayers. Judicially
attacking a rule based on its cost-benefit analysis is a particularly potent approach for activists because it allows a sympathetic court to remand or invalidate the rule without appearing
91
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. For example,
some scholars argue that the Chamber of Commerce initiated
the Chamber of Commerce v. SEC litigation despite its weak
connection to the mutual fund industry in order to spur judicial
92
activism with regard to SEC rulemaking. Strict judicial resources devoted to discovering what procedures and explanations will be required) must be taken from other concerns, such as assessing a rule’s merits or
conducting additional rulemaking proceedings.”).
87. See WILLIAM F. WEST, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: POLITICS AND
PROCESSES 188 (1985).
88. See Cross, supra note 64, at 1046.
89. See WEST, supra note 87, at 188 (“[A]gency resource costs associated
with judicialized procedures were so great that they often served as a disincentive to issue rules or as a lever which industry used to secure concessions
on proposed regulations.”).
90. See Cross, supra note 64, at 1064 (characterizing judicial review of
agency rules as “a legislative bone thrown to the unsuccessful opponents of
regulatory legislation” (quoting MASHAW, supra note 66, at 185)); see also
Brett McDonnell, Dynamic Statutory Interpretations and Sluggish Social
Movements, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 920–21 (1997) (suggesting that political activists often choose to achieve short-run gains through judicial action rather
than long-run gains through directly appealing to Congress because court action does not require mobilizing as many supporters).
91. See Jones, supra note 15, at 1325 (recognizing that successful industry
group challenges to SEC rules in court “embolden regulated entities and the
courts to meddle unnecessarily in otherwise sound rulemaking procedures”);
McGarity, supra note 67, at 1401 (arguing that there is a significant danger of
“judicial overreaching” when a court reviews a rule for the adequacy of its
analysis because the line between procedural review and substantive review
becomes blurred).
92. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices
About Investor Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
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view of the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis is especially troubling
because it can create an avenue for interested parties to challenge SEC rules that are contrary to their political preferences,
thus undermining one of the SEC’s primary institutional ad93
vantages—political independence.
The excessive costs that strict judicial review imposes on
the SEC are particularly burdensome given the SEC’s severe
budget constraints. SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro stated
that the SEC’s current budget “is a strain that is already having an impact on our core mission—separate and apart from
94
the new responsibilities that Congress gave us.” Furthermore,
she estimates that the SEC needs to hire more than 800 new
employees in order to implement the Dodd-Frank legislation
95
but will be unable to do so without additional funding. The litigation and procedural costs associated with stringent judicial
review in combination with the SEC’s inadequate budget ultimately ensure that the SEC will not be able to carry out its responsibilities, including the promulgation of rules that Con96
gress has deemed essential to market recovery. Furthermore,
strict judicial review of cost-benefit analysis may have the perverse effect of forcing the SEC to devote more of its scarce resources to secure lawyers who can anticipate challenges and defend the rules, leaving fewer resources to address the substance
97
of the rule. Courts do not take into account the constraints on
1591, 1594 (2006) (suggesting that interest groups have broad policy objectives
beyond an opposition to the particular rule when they bring legal challenges).
93. See Jones, supra note 15, at 1310, 1332 (noting that the SEC’s insulation from political pressures enables it to fulfill its rulemaking role and that
“[t]he ultimate effect of intrusive judicial review is to deprive the SEC of its
ability to nimbly address new problems and challenges that arise in the financial markets”).
94. Jim Puzzanghera, SEC Chairwoman Warns of Budget Constraints as
Republicans Look to Cut More, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2011, 1:08 PM), http://
latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2011/02/sec-budget-schapiro-republicans
-financial-reform-wall-street.html.
95. Id.
96. See James B. Stewart, As a Watchdog Starves, Wall Street Is Tossed a
Bone, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/
business/budget-cuts-to-sec-reduce-its-effectiveness.html?_r=1 (noting that the
SEC’s 2011 budget was frozen despite the vast expansion of its duties under
the Dodd-Frank legislation and arguing that the House Appropriations Committee is “starving the agency responsible for bringing financial wrongdoers to
justice”).
97. See Cross, supra note 64, at 1039 (arguing that judicial challenges to
agency rules have “spurred agencies to devote exorbitant levels of resources to
lawyering,” forcing agencies to focus more on the process than the substance of
the regulation (citing Loren A. Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight of Admin-
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SEC resources when evaluating a rule, demanding optimal
cost-benefit analysis for the individual rule before it without
considering the consequences on other important rulemaking
98
initiatives.
3. Reluctance to Modify Previously Promulgated Rules
Stringent judicial review of cost-benefit analysis makes the
99
SEC unwilling to modify or repeal enacted rules. Since the
standard of judicial review is the same for repealing or amending old rules as enacting new rules, the SEC is as cautious
about committing substantial resources to update previously
100
enacted rules as it is to promulgate new rules. Justice Breyer
recognized that “[t]he stricter the review and the more clearly
and convincingly the agency must explain the need for change,
the more reluctant the agency will be to change the status
101
quo.” Though agencies were designed to respond with agility
to changing circumstances, the heavy burden of cost-benefit
analysis imposed by stringent judicial review creates a disincentive for the SEC to reopen old rules or simplify their re102
quirements.
Even if experience has proven that a rule
amendment or repeal would be clearly beneficial and desirable,
the SEC is likely to stick to its previous (and perhaps no longer
tenable) position rather than exposing itself to substantial risk
103
by “reopen[ing] a Pandora’s box.” The continuation of previistrative Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 427, 429)); see, e.g., J.W. Verret, The Curious
Case of the Proxy Access Rule, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (July 22, 2011, 1:26
PM),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/07/22/the-curious-case-of-the-proxy
-access-rule/ (suggesting that the SEC’s fundamental problem is that “it is an
agency with too many lawyers and not enough economists”).
98. See Cross, supra note 64, at 1042–43 (arguing that “judicial tunnel
vision” causes courts to demand “unreasonably high standards for individual
regulations” at a severe cost to the agency’s other responsibilities).
99. See McGarity, supra note 67, at 1390.
100. See id. at 1419–20; see also Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG.
257, 294 (1987) (arguing that judicial review of the decision process “gives
enormous leverage to the status quo, whether the status quo is no rule . . . or
the continuance of a rule”).
101. Breyer, supra note 79, at 391; see id. at 391–93 (arguing that strict
judicial review of agency rules creates a disincentive for agencies to update or
even make minor improvements to previously promulgated rules).
102. See McGarity, supra note 67, at 1412 (“Having gone to the considerable effort of a successful rulemaking, the agencies are understandably reluctant to change their rules to adapt to experience with the rules or changed circumstances.”).
103. Jones, supra note 15, at 1324 (arguing that the SEC’s reluctance to
amend rules reduces regulatory flexibility).
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ously enacted rules is the likely result, even if they no longer
comport with experience or are ineffective in light of modern fi104
nancial markets.
4. Disruption of the SEC’s Mission and Statutory Foundation
Strict judicial review of cost-benefit analysis focuses too
heavily on the SEC’s obligation to consider efficiency, competition, and capital formation, while undercutting the SEC’s pri105
mary founding mission to protect investors. The growing importance of cost-benefit analysis distracts the courts from the
SEC’s primary goal of protecting investors because such analysis tends to focus on quantifiable economic results rather than
106
intangible regulatory benefits.
Furthermore, strict judicial
review of cost-benefit analyses has the general effect of reducing the quantity of rules the SEC is able or willing to promul107
gate, thereby undercutting Congress’s protective goals.
The recent D.C. Circuit opinions invalidating SEC rules for
inadequate cost-benefit analyses demand much more extensive
104. See McGarity, supra note 67, at 1390 (“Once an agency has endured
the considerable expense and turmoil of writing a rule, it has every incentive
to leave well enough alone. Once the legal and political dust has settled, an
agency is inclined to let sleeping dogs lie. Even when forced by statute to revisit existing rules, an agency is very reluctant to change them.”).
105. See The Investor ’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, supra note 27. The
requirement that the SEC consider a rule’s effect on capital formation, efficiency, and competition was not added until 1996. See H.R. REP. NO. 104 -622,
at 24 (1996).
106. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 32, at 347 (“Many regulations are meant
to take account of values over and above economic efficiency. . . . A pure costbenefit test, with its omission of distributive, fairness, and procedural concerns, would not encompass the purposes of these statutory mandates.”). For
example, the EPA was reluctant to impose any regulations on hazardous air
pollutants because it feared strict judicial review would invalidate the rule
and, consequently, failed to protect the public from health risks imposed by
such pollutants. See Cross, supra note 64, at 1050 (“If courts insist that ‘regulation, once undertaken, must be draconian, the government avoids regulating
many substances at all.’” (quoting CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 92 (1990))).
107. See Cross, supra note 64, at 1050 (“[J]udicial review perversely undermines the protective goals of statutes by deterring regulation.”); see also
Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors, to
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Aug. 19, 2011), available at http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource%20center/correspondence/2011/081911%20Letter%20to%20SEC%20on%20Proxy%20Access%20%28Final%29.pdf

(arguing that the court’s decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC prevented
the SEC from implementing “a critically important rule designed to benefit
long-term investors and the markets”).
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procedural requirements of the SEC than the statutes pro108
vide. The SEC is statutorily mandated to consider the effects
109
of its rules on competition, efficiency, and capital formation
and the judiciary has the authority to invalidate such rules on110
ly if the rules are arbitrary and capricious. Yet the court has
implied procedural requirements to the SEC’s rulemaking pro111
cess that are not expressed in the guiding statutes, demanding much more extensive cost-benefit analysis than the statutes
112
envisioned. Such judicial activism interferes with congressional intent, creates uncertainty in the rulemaking process,
and makes the SEC more vulnerable to the policy preferences
113
of courts and interest groups.
B. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR MAKING COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS A MORE USEFUL RULEMAKING TOOL
The inconsistent but increasingly stringent judicial review
of SEC cost-benefit analyses has resulted in substantial problems and uncertainty that must be addressed for the SEC to effectively achieve its congressionally delegated responsibili108. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 6, at 1 (“The [Business Roundtable v.
SEC] decision far exceeded the standards set out by Congress and the courts
with respect to cost/benefit analysis.”).
109. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f ) (2006); Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c) (2006).
110. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2011).
111. Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules,
REGULATION, July/Aug. 1981, at 25, 26 (“The courts have attached many procedural requirements not explicit in the APA. Th[i]s include[s] the requirement[ ] . . . that the agency justify the rule in detail and respond to all substantial objections raised by the public comments. The ‘arbitrary and
capricious’ standard for judicial review has evolved from a lick-and-a-promise
to a ‘hard look’ by appellate courts.”).
112. See Letter from Jeff Mahoney to Mary L. Schapiro, supra note 107, at
1 (“The [Business Roundtable v. SEC] decision reflects a failure to abide by the
standards applicable to judicial review of agency determinations and, in particular, agency cost-benefit analysis.”); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two
Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia
Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300,
310 (“In order to survive judicial review, an agency’s ‘concise general’ statement of basis and purpose must deal comprehensively and in detail with each
issue raised in comments, no matter how trivial that issue appears to the
agency.”).
113. See Pierce, supra note 112, at 301 (noting that the D.C. Circuit substitutes its judgment for that of the agency and “imposes rigorous requirements
that agencies support each element of a policy decision with detailed discussion of factual predicates and comprehensive reasoning from factual premises
to policy conclusions”).
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114

ties. Despite the problems that cost-benefit analysis creates
when reviewed under an improperly strict standard, it can be a
valuable tool in the rulemaking process that helps to identify
115
the relative advantages of various regulatory options. This
section discusses three possible approaches to mitigate the
problems caused by strict judicial review of SEC cost-benefit
analysis, thereby allowing cost-benefit analysis to become an
instrument that benefits rulemaking, rather than impeding it.
This section concludes that none of the three approaches discussed provide a realistic solution. The optimal solution is discussed in Part III.
1. Third Party Review of SEC Rules Prior to Enactment
One approach to minimizing the likelihood of judicial invalidation of SEC rules, and the destabilizing effects associated, is
to require the SEC to submit all rules that it intends to implement to a third party that will review and approve the cost116
benefit analysis supporting each rule. The best way to implement this approach is to give the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) oversight responsibility. The OMB is a cabinetlevel executive office that assists the President in supervising
117
administrative agencies. The OMB may be particularly wellsuited for this role because it is already responsible for reviewing executive agencies’ proposed regulations that are economically significant to ensure that the agency has evaluated alter118
natives and assessed the costs and benefits.
In its 2011
114. See supra Part II.A (discussing the problems associated with stringent
judicial review of SEC cost-benefit analysis).
115. See 1 KOCH, supra note 14, § 4:51 (recognizing that cost-benefit analysis assists in rulemaking but cannot replace the rulemaking decision).
116. See McGarity, supra note 67, at 1448–50 (discussing executive review
of agency rulemaking).
117. The Mission and Structure of the Office of Management and Budget,
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_
mission/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
118. See id. See generally Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735
(Sept. 30, 1993) (directing the OMB to review economically significant rules—
i.e., expected annual economic effect of $100 million or greater—proposed by
executive agencies to ensure that the cost-benefit analysis is adequate and
that the regulations are consistent with the President’s priorities and with the
regulations promulgated by other agencies). As an independent agency, the
SEC is not included in the executive order giving the OMB regulatory review
authority over proposed rules. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41974, COST-BENEFIT AND OTHER ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS IN THE
RULEMAKING PROCESS 17 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R41974.pdf.
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Report to Congress, the OMB stated that it would be “desirable
to obtain better information on the benefits and costs of the
119
rules issued by independent regulatory agencies” as well.
Making the OMB responsible for reviewing SEC rules has several advantages. First, it should improve the likelihood that
SEC rules will be upheld in court by putting the cost-benefit
analysis through an additional level of review before the rule is
120
promulgated. Second, the President could implement this approach by amending the executive order requiring OMB review
of other agencies’ rulemaking to include the SEC, which would
be much easier to accomplish than a solution that requires con121
gressional action. Third, the executive order’s limited application to economically significant rules should allow the SEC to
retain some flexibility and discretion over the analyses it con122
ducts for minor rules. Finally, the OMB can create consistency and avoid redundancy across agency regulations, ensuring a
123
more coherent national policy.
There are serious concerns with conferring regulatory review power over SEC rules to the OMB. Such supervisory power gives the President a substantial amount of control, which
124
may undermine the SEC’s independence. One of the OMB’s
regulatory review objectives is to ensure “adherence to . . . the

119. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2011
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 31
(2011).
120. See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An
Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 830 (2003) (arguing that OMB
review of agency rules provides a “quality check on pending rules”); see also
Elaine Buckberg et al., Will Court Short-Circuit Dodd-Frank?, POLITICO (Aug.
15, 2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0811/61363.html#ixzzlV6GiBAVP
(“Better regulation, able to survive review by the D.C. Circuit Court, will likely require incorporating substantive and independent economic analysis into
the development of every rule as standard operating procedure.”).
121. See COPELAND, supra note 118, at 36 n.115 (noting that the decision
not to include independent agencies in OMB review in the past was politically,
not legally, motivated).
122. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,737 (excluding all independent regulatory agencies from the scope of the executive order).
123. See Croley, supra note 120, at 830–31; McGarity, supra note 67, at
1430 (“Substantive presidential review can help ensure consistency in policy
implementation across the executive branch and thereby help prevent agencies from acting at cross-purposes with one another.”).
124. See McGarity, supra note 67, at 1429 (“[T]he OMB review process became the primary vehicle for presidential micro-management of the rulemaking process.”).
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125

President’s priorities and commitments.”
This objective,
along with the OMB’s position as a cabinet-level executive office, creates a clear danger that OMB review conclusions will be
influenced by how well the proposed regulation comports to
126
presidential policy preferences. Though the SEC falls within
the executive branch as an independent agency, review of SEC
rules implementing congressional directives by an executive office implicates separation of powers concerns because it gives
the President authority over rulemaking as well as enforce127
ment. In exchange for the political insulation necessary for
the SEC to effectively promulgate rules, as an independent
agency it is subordinated to all three branches of government—
Congress delegates its rulemaking authority, the President enforces its rules, and the judiciary reviews its rules to ensure
128
that they comply with the statutory authorization. Additionally, OMB review can significantly aggravate rulemaking de129
lays and costs. A close review of the cost-benefit analyses behind rules proposed by many agencies necessarily postpones
130
the enactment of desired regulations.
Furthermore, even
rules that are critically important to the agency may be low in
131
the OMB’s priorities, resulting in further delay. Worse yet,
the OMB’s political influences could cause it to threaten delay
in order to extort the agency into conceding to substantive
132
changes to the rule. In sum, OMB review of SEC cost-benefit
125. The Mission and Structure of the Office of Management and Budget,
supra note 117.
126. See McGarity, supra note 67, at 1432–33 (noting that “OMB staffers
are not reluctant to supplant congressional policy judgments with their own
policy preferences,” which can significantly alter the substance of the rule).
127. See Croley, supra note 120, at 832 (“[A]ctivist presidential oversight is
meddlesome, for Congress delegates regulatory power to agencies, not to the
president, and while the president is charged with executing the law, that
constitutional charge does not justify presidential reshaping of agencies' regulatory initiatives.”).
128. Certain aspects of executive enforcement are particularly controversial. See id. at 833 (arguing that congressionally granted agency discretion
should not be supplanted by presidential preferences); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 983–84 (1997) (arguing that
the President should not act “as if rulemakings were his rulemakings”).
129. See supra Part II.A.1 (rulemaking delay).
130. See McGarity, supra note 67, at 1432 (noting that OMB review of
large regulatory projects can take years).
131. See id. at 1431.
132. See id. at 1433 (noting that agencies may “covertly allow their decisions to be guided by considerations that Congress has precluded or to reflect
extrastatutory policies” in order to salvage some remnant of the rule from
OMB review).
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analysis is not a viable solution because it magnifies problems
of rulemaking delays and costs and involves significant separation of powers and independence risks, which outweigh any
consistency benefits or negligible improvement in cost-benefit
analysis quality.
2. Increase the SEC’s Budget to Support Comprehensive CostBenefit Analysis
Another possible approach to alleviating the negative effects of aggressive judicial review of cost-benefit analysis is to
boost the SEC’s budget to accommodate the increased burden
imposed by conducting a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis
for each rule. An important reason behind the SEC’s failure to
effectively fulfill its responsibilities is its severe budget con133
straints. Congress cannot realistically expect the SEC to be
successful when it delegates massive rulemaking tasks but fails
134
to provide enough resources to complete them. Though increased budget appropriations would go a long way in aiding
the overworked SEC staff, it is highly unlikely in a time of debt
crisis and opposition to tax increases that the SEC’s tight
135
budget will change anytime soon. The SEC’s 2011 budget was
136
frozen despite a significant increase in its responsibilities.
Not only is the SEC unlikely to see an increase in its budget
large enough to address the problems of rulemaking delay and
cost, but budgetary relief alone would not be enough to address
the disruption of the SEC’s mission that undue emphasis on
cost-benefit analysis creates.
3. Enact Legislation Heightening the SEC’s Cost-Benefit
Analysis Obligations
Another approach to managing the problems associated
with aggressive judicial review of SEC cost-benefit analysis is
to statutorily require the SEC to conduct a comprehensive costbenefit analysis for each rule, essentially codifying the most
stringent judicial opinions. A bill introduced in June 2011 proposes to take this approach by amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require the SEC to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis according to a list of enumerated considerations before

133.
134.
135.
136.

See supra Part II.A.2 (rulemaking costs).
See McGarity, supra note 67, at 1437.
See id.
See Stewart, supra note 96.
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137

promulgating any rule. The bill also requires the SEC to periodically review previously enacted rules to determine whether
they are “outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively bur138
densome,” which helps to ensure the continued efficacy of existing rules. The greatest benefit of this approach is its potential to alleviate uncertainty, which underlies many of the
139
problems discussed in Part II.A. Furthermore, a clear definition of cost-benefit analysis requirements may help to curtail
the practice of judicially challenging a rule to accomplish the
policy objectives of interest groups, which in turn would de140
crease litigation costs.
Though this approach appears beneficial on its face, multiple complicating factors undercut its viability. The most fatal
defect is that it is impossible for the SEC to comply with these
heightened statutory requirements without a substantial budg141
etary increase, which is highly unlikely to occur. This approach is extremely expensive to implement and likely will not
produce a significant improvement in the quality of relatively
142
minor rules. Additionally, requiring such a high level of costbenefit analysis for every rule inevitably amplifies problems of
143
rulemaking delay. Finally, it is questionable whether codifying specific requirements can adequately address the everchanging application of cost-benefit analysis to a broad range of
rules. Statutorily mandating heightened cost-benefit analysis
obligations for the SEC is not a workable option because it amplifies the problems of rulemaking delay and cost and attempts
137. See SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 2308, 112th Cong. § 2
(2011).
138. Id. § 2(e)(4).
139. See supra Part II.A; see also Friedman et al., supra note 36, at 657–58
(arguing that uncertainty leads to an ossification of the rulemaking process).
140. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing interest groups’ use of judicial review
to advance policy preferences); see also Langevoort, supra note 92, at 1594.
141. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the SEC’s budget constraints); see
also Arthur Levitt, Jr., Don’t Gut the SEC, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/opinion/dont-gut-the-sec.html (“What we
need is not a requirement to do more cost-benefit analysis, but better tools to
do the work well and with more precision. Otherwise, cost-benefit analysis will
become a permanent and immovable wall to future efforts to improve the stability, safety and transparency of financial markets.”).
142. See COPELAND, supra note 118, at 35.
143. See supra Part II.A.1 (rulemaking delay); see also COPELAND, supra
note 118, at 35 (arguing that requiring a cost-benefit analysis for all rules
without respect to their size or importance would “delay hundreds of nonsignificant, administrative rules that industry and the public would often like
to see in place (e.g., traffic separation schedules and temporary safety zones)”).
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to expressly define a process that essentially boils down to caseby-case judicial discretion.
In light of the significant problems threatening the SEC’s
long-term effectiveness and the failures of various approaches
to solve them, Part III endorses a final approach that provides
the optimal balance of agency discretion tempered by appropriate checks on the arbitrary exercise of its discretion.
III. CONGRESS SHOULD LIMIT THE SCOPE OF THE
SEC’S REQUIRED COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The current state of judicial review of SEC cost-benefit
analysis is one of debilitating uncertainty that subjects SEC
144
rulemaking to an impossibly high standard. A viable solution
to this situation must promote greater consistency and predictability in judicial review of SEC cost-benefit analysis, enabling
the SEC to efficiently fulfill its primary mission of protecting
145
investors. Accordingly, this Note argues that the best solution
is a clear statement by Congress expressly limiting the re146
quired scope of SEC cost-benefit analysis. A similar statement by the Supreme Court would be the next best solution.
Such action is necessary to ensure that cost-benefit analysis of
SEC rules is a worthwhile and productive exercise.
A difficulty inherent to this approach is appropriately defining the limitation on cost-benefit analysis requirements. One
method is to mandate cost-benefit analysis only for “economi147
cally significant” rules while giving the SEC discretion to
conduct such an analysis for other rules. Judicial review of costbenefit analysis that the SEC conducts could be expressly lim144. See Keller, supra note 63 (discussing the Business Roundtable v. SEC
decision and commenting that “[t]here are many (and I am one) who, although
believing the SEC acted unwisely in adopting proxy access, at least in the form
of [the proxy access rule], are concerned about the high, nigh impossible, bar
the Court set that could put in jeopardy most SEC rulemaking of any complexity or controversy”).
145. See The Investor ’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, supra note 27.
146. See generally McGarity, supra note 67, at 1462 (“Although informal
rulemaking should never be entirely free of constraints imposed by the President, Congress, and the courts, a successful future for this decisionmaking device requires that all three branches ‘back off ’ and let it function with greater
freedom and flexibility.”).
147. The executive order requiring OMB review of executive agency rules
similarly limits OMB review to rules that are economically significant (i.e.,
rules with an annual economic effect greater than $100 million). See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
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ited to enforcing clear congressional directives and courts could
be required to defer to the SEC’s interpretation of ambiguous
statutory terms and to its conclusions when empirical findings
148
are unavailable or uncertain.
Though there is significant
149
precedential support for these limitations on judicial review,
the failure of the Supreme Court to expressly define judicial re150
view of agency cost-benefit analysis, along with the signifi151
cant degree of inconsistency within the D.C. Circuit alone,
clearly demonstrates the need for authoritative guidance in
this area.
One avenue to implement this solution is for the Supreme
Court to reemphasize the principle of judicial deference specifi152
cally in the context of cost-benefit analysis. Supreme Court
action has the potential advantage of being relatively swift,
provided that the Court grants certiorari to a case raising this
issue. However, it may not be effective in ensuring consistency
among the lower courts, especially given the fact that appellate
courts have a history of expanding the role of judicial review in
agency rulemaking despite Supreme Court efforts to restrict
153
it. As a result, Supreme Court action may not be a complete
148. See MASHAW, supra note 66, at 166 (“Legal review by the courts
should assure that authority exercised is authority legitimately conferred, that
it is neither misused nor neglected, and that the basic norms of participatory
fairness and substantive nonarbitrariness are respected.”); Pierce, supra note
112, at 322, 327 (arguing that courts should give agencies a high degree of deference when reviewing their findings of fact “in conditions of uncertainty” and
should “confine their role to enforcing those policy decisions Congress actually
has made”).
149. See, e.g., Greenbaum v. EPA, 370 F.3d 527, 542 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding the APA’s arbitrariness standard satisfied when there is a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made” (quoting Burlington
Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))); Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (same); Anderson v. U.S. Dep’t of
Transp., 213 F.3d 422, 423 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); Office of Commc’n of United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1440 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[C]ost-benefit
analyses epitomize the types of decisions that are most appropriately entrusted to the expertise of an agency; certainly appellate briefs and arguments
would ill-equip a court that would seek to balance for itself the myriad considerations involved in any complex administrative policy decision.”). A court is
not permitted to substitute its own policy judgment for that of the agency.
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513–14 (2009).
150. See 1 KOCH, supra note 14, § 4:51(3) (“The Supreme Court has engaged in a rather ambiguous treatment of cost/benefit analysis.”).
151. See supra Part I.C.
152. See Pierce, supra note 112, at 327–28 (arguing that “the Supreme
Court must play a significant role” in solving the problems caused by courts
“imposing unrealistic requirements on agencies”).
153. See id. at 304 (“[T]he D.C. Circuit consistently expanded the role of
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solution, though it would certainly provide a much-needed
start.
A second way to implement this solution is for Congress to
codify the suggested limitations on judicial review of SEC cost154
benefit analysis. The most significant drawback of this approach is that it requires the political momentum necessary to
pass federal legislation. However, Congress’s desire for the SEC
to enact the Dodd-Frank legislation in a timely and costeffective manner may make this legislation more appealing to
155
lawmakers. Furthermore, congressional action is clearly authoritative and is more likely to change the way courts review
the cost-benefit analyses supporting SEC rules.
Either congressional or Supreme Court implementation of
this solution would promote significant improvements to the
SEC’s current rulemaking process by reducing rulemaking delays and costs associated with the uncertainty surrounding judicial review, thus giving the SEC more flexibility in revisiting
old rules and carrying out its founding mission without undue
fears of aggressive judicial review. Though congressional action
is the preferable alternative given its binding impact, Supreme
Court action is also a desirable approach, especially if it is more
likely to occur.
CONCLUSION
The inconsistent and increasingly stringent standards of
judicial review imposed on SEC cost-benefit analyses have created significant uncertainty in the rulemaking process. This
uncertainty over judicial requirements of cost-benefit analysis
causes the SEC to conduct extensive cost-benefit analyses for
all of its rules in order to protect them from risk of invalidation.
The result is substantial and debilitating delays in rule promulgation, rapidly rising costs, a reluctance to update existing
rules, and distraction away from the SEC’s primary mission—
protecting investors. The SEC’s massive rulemaking responsibility under the Dodd-Frank legislation only aggravates these
the judiciary in policymaking, while the Supreme Court attempted to force the
D.C. Circuit to assume a less expansive role in government policymaking. The
Supreme Court’s efforts to date have not been successful.”).
154. See McGarity, supra note 67, at 1443 (noting that Congress could
amend the APA to limit the extent of cost-benefit analysis required of agencies).
155. See Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, supra note 10 (noting the multitude of Dodd-Frank provisions
that require expedient SEC rulemaking).
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problems, which collectively endanger the continuing efficacy of
the SEC.
Judicial review of SEC cost-benefit analysis must be clearly constrained in a way that requires courts to defer to the
SEC’s empirical findings. Congressional enactment of a statement limiting the reach of judicial review over agency costbenefit analysis is likely to be the effective avenue for implementing the desired change. However, Supreme Court action
applying such a limitation would also go a long way toward
tempering the appellate courts’ imposition of excessive demands on SEC cost-benefit analysis. Either alternative would
substantially increase predictability and consistency in the
rulemaking process, establish more realistic expectations for
SEC rules, and help ensure that SEC use of cost-benefit analysis for a given rule itself passes a cost-benefit test.

